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repealed a statute vesting certain power in counties? Would the county
be required to forego the exercise of this power even after its inclusion
in the charter?
The difficulty seems to be that the Constitutional Amendment did
not express dearly the intention and purposes of the framers. The re-
quirement as to special majorities was not included merely to make the
adoption of a charter more difficult. It was meant to protect the munic-
ipalities from an invasion of their home rule powers. The amendment
would have expressed this purpose more dearly if, instead of requiring
the special majorities on the vesting of any municipal power in the
county, it had required them only if the municipalities were divested of
any municipal authority. A court favorable to the county charter plan
could have read the Amendment in the light of its evident purpose. The
wording of it was such that another interpretation was possible.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
NEGLIGENCE
INTOXICATION - NEGLIGENCE PER SE OR EVIDENCE FOR JURY?
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $3500 for injuries which
he sustained while riding in Pyler's car, which the latter was driving.
The defendant's bus collided with the car. It was found that the bus
driver was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision, also that no joint enterprise existed between the plaintiff
and Pyler. The court charged that Pyler's violation of the ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated would not make him negligent
unless it was proved that he was so befuddled by reason of the liquor
that the accident occurred as a proximate result of that intoxication.
The Appellate Court, in upholding this decision, agreed that no
joint enterprise existed and therefore, as the negligence of defendant's
servant was a proximate cause of the collision, the negligence of Pyler
was immaterial. The court went on to say that if Pyler's negligence
had been a point in issue, the fact that he was intoxicated prior to and
at the time of the collision would be merely evidence of the probability
that he was not using due care, and would not constitute negligence
per se to which legal liability would attach in a damage suit. Cleveland
Ry. Co. v. Owens, 51 Ohio App. 53 (Jan. 2o, 1936).
The dictum of the Ohio Court in the principal case follows the
almost unanimous opinion of the courts of this country in holding that
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intoxication does not make a prima facie case of negligence. W'Vise v.
Schneider, 88 So. 662, 205 Ala. 537 (1921); Guhl v. Warroad Stock,
Grain & Produce Co., 179 N.W. 564, 147 Minn. 44 (1920)- Evi-
dence of intoxication is admissible in proving that the defendant was
negligent; Lincoln Taxicab Co. v. Smith, 15o N.Y.S. 86; 88 Misc.
9 (1914); The Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, ii Ohio App. 424
(I919); and it is a question for the jury to decide whether, under the
circumstances, the party exercised, or was capable of exercising, ordinary
care. The Cleveland .Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, supra; Jewel v. Rogers
T. P., 175 N.W. 151, 208 Mich. 318 (1919); Powell v. Berry, 89
S.E. 753, 145 Ga. 696, L.R.A. I91 7 A, 3o6 (1916).
Professor Edgerton, in 39 Harvard L. Rev. 849 (1926), advocates
an objective test for negligence rather than a subjective test. Negligence
should be dependent on outward conduct rather than the presence or
absence of certain mental phenomena which make up the state of mind.
The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589, 49 L. Ed. 61o, 25 Sup. Ct. 317
(905); Labreque v. Donham, 127 N.E. 537, 236 Mass. io (1920).
These authorities indicate that there is an objective standard, or conduct
test for negligence, which seems to be used almost entirely by courts in
determining whether intoxication indicates that a man is negligent or
not. They are not concerned with his state of mind but with his out-
ward acts and dangerous conduct.
On the other hand Professor Seavey, 41 Harvard L. Rev. i (1927),
suggests the principle that "it is negligent for one to enter into a course
of conduct when he knows or should know that because of his individual
qualities he either should not enter upon the undertaking at all or should
do so only by making special provision to guard against results expectable
from its defects." And in Wood v. Board of County Commissioners,
128 Ind. 289, 27 N.E. 611 (I89O), it was said that voluntary intoxi-
cation is in itself negligence. Obviously, the courts must apply the sub-jective test in some cases. The most prominent exceptions are that
children are not required to come up to the standard of conduct of adults
to be free of contributory negligence. Quinn v. Ross Motor Car Co.,
157 Wis. 543, 747 N.W. IOOO (1914); nor is a person who is
mentally deficient, Worthington v. Mercer, 96 Ala. 310, II So. 72,
17 L.R.A. 407 (1891). Deaf and blind persons may not be required
to conform entirely to the standard of conduct of the normal man but
they are required to employ the use of their other senses more extensively
to attempt to meet that standard. i Thompson on Negligence, 430;
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Buckner, 28 Ill. 299 (1862); Clev., Colum-
bus, & Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Terry, ? Ohio St. 585 (1858).
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However, there is a distinct difference between physical deficiencies
and intoxication. Poor eyesight and hearing cannot always be remedied
but intoxication is usually a voluntary condition wherein the person
intoxicated risks losing the full use of his senses. So there is not as
much reason why the courts should include intoxication in the exceptions
to the objective standard test. But if the intoxicated man does meet the
requirements of this test and his conduct or acts are equal to what the
reasonably prudent sober man would do in the circumstances, that is all
that is required. WILLIAM M. DRENNEN.
WANTON MISCONDUCT DISTINGUISHED FROM NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff collided with the rear of a truck owned by defendant. The
evidence showed that the truck was parked a few feet from the side of
the road and that the night was misty and rainy. Whether or not the
tail light of the truck was burning was a disputed fact, but the accident
occurred near a street light. It was admitted by the plaintiff that he
was driving at a speed such that he could not bring his car to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead. In his amended petition plain-
tiff characterized the act of the defendant as "wanton, wilful, gross
negligence and misconduct." The trial judge charged the jury on the
issue of wanton negligence stating that if such be found defendant could
not avail himself of his plea of contributory negligence.
Held: Facts must be pleaded which reveal on their face the element
of wantonness and it was an error on the part of the trial judge to
instruct the jury on the question of wantonness in this case. Universal
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 2o Abs. No. 18, vii,
5 Ohio Op. 214 (1936).
The distinction between a wilful act and a negligent act is rather
well defined. A wilful act is one in which the party acting intends to
bring about a certain result. A negligent act is one in which the party
acting fails to come up to a required standard of care. Payne v. Vance,
103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921); Stauffer v. Schlegel, 74 Ind.
App. 431, 129 N.E. 44 (1930).
The law often treats a wilful act more severely than a negligent one.
Contributory negligence is no defense when the defendant has been
guilty of a wilful act. Payne v. Vance, supra. Punitive damages may
be secured against a wilful tortfeasor but not against a negligent one.
Simpson et al. v. McCa/frey, 13 Ohio 509 (1844) ; in Ohio a driver of
a car is liable to a gratuitous guest for a wilful injurious act but not for
his negligence. Ohio G.C. Sec. 6308-6.
